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THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION IN
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Thomas F. Burke*
In Buckley vs. Valeo,t the Supreme Court put the concept of
corruption at the center of campaign finance law. The Court
held that only society's interest in preventing "corruption and the
appearance of corruption" outweighed the limits on free expression created by restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures. Other goals, such as equalizing the influence of
citizens over elections, limiting the influence of money in
electoral politics, or creating more competitive elections, were
rejected as insufficiently compelling to justify regulating political
speech.2 The Court's focus on corruption has been reiterated in
a series of cases following Buckley, which have decided whether
various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, or local laws, violate the First Amendment.J Barring a major shift in
this area of law, corruption is the criterion by which the constitutionality of further reforms in campaign finance regulation will
be measured.
The Court's emphasis on "corruption and the appearance of
corruption" has stimulated criticism on several fronts. From the
left, the Court is criticized for not giving credence to other interests served by campaign finance regulation.4 From the right
comes the criticism that the Court has been inconsistent in its
* Copyright© 1997 by Thomas F. Burke, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Wellesley College. Ph.D. 1996, Political Science, University of California-Berkeley; B.A.
1988, Mass Communications, University of Minnesota. I wish to thank Jonathan Bernstein, Bruce Cain, Paul Edwards, Daniel Lowenstein, Hanna Pitkin, Nelson Polsby, and
Dennis Thompson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. 424 u.s. 1 (1975).
2. Id. at 25-27.
3. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S.
182 (1981); FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982); FEC v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652 (1990); and Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309
(1996).
4. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609 (1982).
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application of the corruption standard.s Others find the problem
in the term "corruption" itself. Frank Sorauf argues that while
the phrase "has a ring that most Americans will like ... its apparent clarity is deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded."6 Yet
whatever its flaws, politicians, activists, judges and even picky
academics continually employ the concept of corruption in their
claims about the campaign finance system. I hope in this article
to give some sense of both the possibilities and the limits of understanding campaign finance as an issue of corruption.
The first part of the article briefly considers the concept of
corruption and the ways in which academic commentators have
explored it. The second part analyzes how "corruption" has been
employed in a series of Supreme Court cases beginning with
Buckley. Finally, the third part defends what I call the "monetary influence" standard of corruption as the most appropriate
one to use in controversies over campaign finance. This defense
turns out to be a rather complex enterprise; it requires a turn
back to the foundations of representative democracy. Any adequate standard of corruption, I argue, must be grounded in a
convincing theory of representation.
I. THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION
Even the dictionary definitions of corruption suggest that it
is a tricky term. The Oxford English Dictionary gives nine basic
definitions of corruption, but there is an element common to all:
a notion that something pure, or natural, or ordered has decayed
or become degraded. Corruption was used in medieval times to
denote physical processes such as infection or decomposition.?
When corruption is proclaimed in political life it presumes some
ideal state. Corruption is thus a loaded term: you cannot call
something corrupt without an implicit reference to some ideal.
In order to employ the concept of corruption in the context of a
political controversy, such as that over campaign finance, one
must have some underlying notion of the pure, original or natural state of the body politic.
5. See Antonin Scalia's dissent in Austin, 494 U.S. at 679.
6. Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign
Finance, 3 Const. Cornrn. 97, 103 (1986). See also two wide-ranging critiques of the
Court's corruption standard: Jonathan Bernstein, Goo Goo Terror, 95 Inst. of Governmental Studies Working Paper 22, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California-Berkeley (1995); and Ron Schmidt, Jr., Defining Corruption: Plunkitt to Buckley
and Beyond, 95 Institute of Governmental Studies Working Paper 21, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California-Berkeley (1995).
7. J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner, eds., 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 972-74
(Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1989).
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Not surprisingly, then, academics have had difficulty arriving
at satisfactory criteria for deciding what is corrupt. James Scott
divides attempts into three approaches: legal norms, public opinion, and the public interests A legal norms approach focuses on
the laws and formal rules of a given society in determining what
is corrupt and what is not.9 While such an approach may be useful in comparative research, it seems unlikely that it can help us
in a discussion of a legal controversy.w After all, we can't very
well refer to the rules of our society when the issue is what those
rules should be.
The public opinion approach is similarly problematic.u It
may seem sensible to define what is corrupt by finding out what
most people in a given society consider corrupt, but on most of
the interesting questions public opinion is likely to be ambiguous.
As Scott points out, there is no clear, non-arbitrary way to decide
what level of social consensus is necessary before we declare a
given act corrupt.lz Should a mere majority be sufficient, or
should unanimity be required? Should the opinions of the more
educated, those better informed, or those more interested in
politics, be given more weight? Public opinion will always be an
unsteady guide except in the easy cases.
Finally there is the public interest approach, which involves
defining some ideal against which corrupt conduct can be measured. This approach merely gauges what is corrupt in terms of
an even more contested concept, the "public interest." Political
scientists, who have given the most thought to the concept of cor8. See James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption 3-5 (Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1972). For a full discussion of the ways in which corruption has been defined in political
science, see Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative
Analysis 3-8 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970). This book contains a vast number
of essays and articles by comparative and American political scientists on corruption.
One attempt to consolidate the various definitions into one coherent scheme is John G.
Peters' and Susan Welch's, Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a
Theory, or If Political Corruption Is in the Mainstream of American Politics Why Is It Not
in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 974 (1978).
9. This is the approach taken, for example, by Joseph Nye, who defines corruption
as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of privateregarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence." J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis in Heidenheimer, ed., Political
Corruption 564, 566-67 (cited in note 8).
10. This is a point Dan Lowenstein makes in his article Political Bribery and the
Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784 (1985). Lowenstein discusses the
problem of defining corruption at 798-804.
11. Heidenheimer takes a modified public opinion approach; he considers the opinions of both public officials and mass public opinion. See Heidenheimer, ed., Political
Corruption at 3-28 (cited in note 8).
12. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption at 4 (cited in note 8).
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ruption, have had trouble even agreeing that there is some such
thing as the public interest, much less defining what that interest
involves.13 Thus all three approaches have serious problems.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this article I need not pretend that there is some unifying, global criterion of corruption.
Rather, my task is to give some sense to the term as it is used in
the discussion of campaign finance law. Yet even in this more
limited realm it is hard to see where we are to draw our standards
from.
II.

CORRUPTION AND THE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE CASES

Buckley and its progeny are complex, confusing cases. At
times even passages in a single opinion seem to contradict each
other. Thus it is no surprise that commentators have differed in
their interpretation of the Court's treatment of corruption. Lillian BeVier, writing in 1985, concludes that under the Court's rulings the "only activity that may become the target of corruptionpreventing legislation is that of securing or attempting to secure
'political quid pro quos from current and potential officeholders. "'14 By this criterion, only pre-arranged deals-trades of
votes for money-qualify legally as corrupt. Paul Edwards further develops the quid pro quo standard of corruption and claims
that with Austin the Court made a "dramatic change" in its approach by veering away from this limited definition of corruption
to a much broader one, influenced perhaps by Rawlsian liberalism.ls Frank Sorauf, by contrast, finds hints even in the earlier
13. Frank Sorauf reviewed this debate in The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19 J. of
Politics 616 (1957). Sorauf criticizes the term as "subjective and imprecise" and calls various definitions of it "illogical." ld. at 633. Sorauf argues that outcomes of public policymaking cannot be judged by a public interest standard. Nevertheless, Sorauf says there
is a public interest in the process by which policies are created. Thus Sorauf identifies the
public interest with the "process of group accommodation." Id. at 638. This leaves some
ground for pluralists like Sorauf to use a public interest concept in evaluating campaign
finance procedures. Robert Dahl similarly finds the "common good" in "practices, arrangements, institutions, and processes that ... promote the well-being of ourselves and
others .... " Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 307 (Yale U. Press, 1989). Like
Sorauf, Dahl's discussion of practices that promote the common good suggests that Dahl
could employ a public interest concept in evaluating issues of campaign finance.
14. Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1082 (1985). BeVier is quoting from
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
15. Paul S. Edwards, Defining Political Corruption: The Supreme Court's Role, 10
BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 3 (1996).
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cases that the Court's concerns went beyond pure quid pro
quos.16
While quid pro quo is no doubt a major theme in the campaign finance cases, I think Sorauf is right to suggest that the
Court went well beyond this standard even before Austin. In the
series of cases beginning with Buckley and ending with Austin,
three distinct standards of corruption that are advanced, though
at several points the Court blurs them. I label them quid pro
quo, monetary influence, and distortion.
The quid pro quo standard is simply that it is corrupt for an
officeholder to take money in exchange for some action. The
money may be a bribe for personal use or a campaign contribution. The deal is explicit, with both sides acknowledging that a
trade is being made.
The monetary influence standard is broader. Here the root
idea is that it is corrupt for officeholders to perform their public
duties with monetary considerations in mind. The influence of
money is corrupting under this standard even if no explicit deal is
made.
The third standard of corruption is distortion. The ideal behind this standard is that the decisions of officeholders should
closely reflect the views of the public. Campaign contributions
are corrupting to the extent that they do not reflect the balance
of public opinion and thus distort policymaking through their influence on elections.
The three standards of corruption-quid pro quo, monetary
influence and distortion-have been jumbled together in the
corpus of campaign finance law.
Quid Pro Quo Versus Monetary Influence

In Buckley, the Court struck down limitations on campaign
expenditures, but upheld contribution limits. Contributions, the
Court said, were less speech-like than expenditures and thus deserved lesser protection.17 But contributions are also more regulatable because they, unlike expenditures, can be a source of
corruption by influencing the conduct of representatives. While
the Court at first emphasizes the danger of quid pro quo in dis16. "But while the quid pro quo is the nub of the matter, it is perhaps not the total·
ity of it." Sorauf, 3 Const. Comm. at 103 (cited in note 6).
17. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-29.
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cussing the problem of corruption,1s it also notes that the state's
interest goes beyond mere bribery: "But laws making criminal
the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant
and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action."19 This pattern is repeated in succeeding cases.
The Court mentions the quid pro quo standard, but also suggests
that corruption goes beyond pre-arranged trading of votes for
contributions. Here the Court is hinting at the monetary influence standard.
In National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,zo the Court struck
down a Massachusetts law forbidding corporations and banks
from spending money in referenda campaigns.21 The Court followed Buckley in reasoning that while the First Amendment interest in such independent expenditures is high, there is no threat
of corruption because in referenda elections there is no candidate to corrupt. In a footnote the majority opinion distinguished
the Massachusetts law from the longstanding Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, which bars corporate spending in candidate
elections:
The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such
as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of
political debts. The importance of the governmental interest
in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.22

Here again the Court seems to go beyond the concern about quid
pro quo vote-trading, this time to characterize corruption as "the
creation of political debts." Four years later, in FEC v. National
Right to Work Comm.,23 the Court again discussed the need to
insure that corporate "war chests" not be used to create "political debts."24
For the most part in these early cases the Court does little to
explain its notion of corruption, and we are left to read between
the lines. But Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the 1984
18. "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro
quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined." Id. at 26.
19. Id. at 27-28.
20. 435 u.s. 765 (1978).
21. Id. at 795.
22. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26 (1978) (citation omitted).
23. 459 u.s. 197 (1982).
24. Id. at 207-11.
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case of FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.zs
offers a definition:
Corruption is a subversion of the political process.
Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves
or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors.26

Here a much wider standard of corruption appears with a restatement of the familiar quid pro quo as a "hallmark." Rehnquist says that elected officials violate their public trust when
they are influenced by the "prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns." If Rehnquist
had wanted to limit the corruption interest to quid pro quos, he
could simply have said so. Instead he calls quid pro quo votetrading merely the "hallmark" of political corruption. In this
passage, the Court again seems to be acknowledging the monetary influence standard of corruption.
Despite this acknowledgment, a clearer passage in Rehnquist's opinion in NCPAC reverts to the narrow quid pro quo
standard. Relying on Buckley in distinguishing the regulation of
expenditures from the regulations of contributions, Rehnquist
concludes that expenditures made independently by a political
action committee to support a particular candidate pose little
danger of corruption. Here he emphasizes that "the absence of
prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate."z7 Overall, then, in NCPAC
the Court seems to be moving towards the more narrow quid pro
quo standard.
Distortion

That movement is reversed in the 1986 case FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.zs Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, held that a state law restricting independent expenditures for candidate elections was overbroad as applied to the appellee, a non-profit corporation. Brennan argued that advocacy
groups such as MCFLI should be distinguished from profit-seek25.
26.
27.
28.

470 u.s. 480 (1985).
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
479 u.s. 238 (1986).
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ing corporations, who pose a real danger of distorting the political process through their accretion of wealth. Citing several
earlier corporate cases, Brennan said the precedents reflected
concern "about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for
political purposes." Non-profit corporations "do not pose that
danger of corruption. "29 This is the only point in the opinion in
which Brennan clarifies, even by implication, just what he means
by corruption. Brennan's main argument is that corporate political spending poses a threat to the "political marketplace" because the "resources in the treasury of a business corporation ...
are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's
political ideas. "3o Here Brennan embraces the distortion
standard.
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,31 decided in
1990, amplifies this theme and links it more clearly to the concept
of corruption. The case concerned an independent expenditure
made by the Chamber of Commerce to promote a candidate for
the U.S. House of Representatives. In Buckley, the Court had
concluded that such independent expenditures posed a relatively
small risk of corruption since candidates were far less likely to
feel a debt to independent spenders than contributors. In upholding a law barring such independent expenditures, the Court
could merely have taken issue with this assessment and declared
that independent expenditures also create political debts.32 Instead, Justice Marshall's opinion defines a new concept of corruption, borrowed partly from Brennan's opinion in MCFLI:
Regardless of whether [the] danger of "financial quid pro
quo" corruption ... may be sufficient to justify a restriction on
independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.33
29. ld. at 259.
30. Id. at 258.
31. 494 u.s. 652 (1990).
32. This is what Justice Stevens, who wrote a concurring opinion, would do, at least
for corporate contributions. See id. at 678-79 n.• (quoting First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788, n.26 (1978)).
33. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60. In the latest Supreme Court campaign finance case,
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996), Justice
Breyer's plurality opinion steers clear of the distortion standard of corruption but does
not clearly embrace either the quid pro quo or monetary influence standards. The case
involved FECA limits on party expenditures in congressional elections. Breyer's opinion
considers only the narrow question of whether independent, uncoordinated party expendi-
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Here corruption is no longer tied to the conduct of the officeholder, but instead concerns the power of the corporate spender
in the political marketplace. Although some of Marshall's argument was anticipated in MCFLI, the Austin opinion represents
the flowering of the distortion conception of corruption.
In a typically bombastic dissent Justice Scalia castigated the
majority's "New Corruption":
Under this mode of analysis, virtually anything the Court
deems politically undesirable can be turned into political corruption-by simply describing its effects as politically "corrosive," which is close enough to "corruptive" to qualify ....
The Court's opinion ultimately rests upon that proposition
whose violation constitutes the "New Corruption": Expenditures must "reflect actual public support for the political ideas
espoused." This illiberal free-speech principle of "one man,
one minute" was proposed and soundly rejected in Buck/ey.34

In Buckley, the Court had rejected equalization as a legitimate
goal for campaign finance law, concluding that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment."3s Scalia charged that the majority had simply resurrected the equalization theory in a new
guise-the New Corruption.

Evaluating The Standards
Austin's distortion standard of corruption has broad implications. As noted above, to use the term "corruption" one must
have some underlying notion of an ideal state. Marshall's opinion suggests that in his ideal state expenditures are calibrated to
actual public support. A deviation from this constitutes corruption and may be regulated. Because just about any private financing scheme is likely to have "distortions"-to not reflect
underlying public support-Marshall's principle would justify
very strong regulatory measures.36 Indeed it is difficult to square
Marshall's principle with any system of private financing for
political campaigns.
tures can be constitutionally limited. Following the logic of Buckley, Breyer argues that
the lack of coordination between the candidate and the spender in an independent expenditure limits the danger of corruption. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2317.
34. Austin, 494 U.S. at 684.
35. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
36. It is important to remember that Marshall limits his principle to "the unique
legal and economic characteristics of corporations." See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60.
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Even those who might be attracted to Marshall's ideal, or
think that corporations can constitutionally be kept from throwing their monetary weight around, may shrink from describing
this as a problem of corruption. "Corruption" can be used to
describe any movement away from an ideal; this is the sense in
which illness is a corruption of the body. But in politics "corruption" has typically had a more specific connotation: that an officeholder has been led by private inducements away from the
ideal of disinterested public service. As Justice Scalia charges,
the majority opinion in Austin takes advantage of this connotation by confiating the relatively uncontroversial ideal of disinterested public service with the far more problematic ideal of
"undistorted" campaign finance. The rhetoric of corruption is
used to champion an ideal so sweeping that, if taken literally,
would condemn any imaginable private campaign finance system-and perhaps even public financing systems in which the
funding is not carefully calibrated to public support.
But while Austin's standard of corruption is too broad, the
quid pro quo standard is too narrow, as the Court has recognized
from time to time. Indeed, if only pure vote-trading is considered corrupt, it is difficult to see how the Court could uphold any
contribution limits.
The quid pro quo conception focuses on pre-arrangement as
the truly corrupting aspect of vote-trading. Under this standard,
it does not matter whether contributions influence public officials' stands on public policy, so long as there is no formal deal
made. But deals-trades of votes for money-were outlawed
long before the advent of campaign finance regulation. As
Daniel Lowenstein has pointed out, many courts have held that
campaign contributions can be bribes, and bribery convictions
based on campaign contributions have been upheld in many jurisdictions.37 Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, regulations which impair free speech must be "narrowly tailored" to
achieving a compelling state interest. If Congress could constitutionally regulate only quid pro quo corruption, it is difficult to
see why it would be allowed to go beyond simple bribery laws.
Why regulate so much legitimate "speech" in an effort to stop
bribery when you can instead simply outlaw bribery? Contribu37. Such convictions have become far more common recently; see Daniel H. Lowenstein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a Bribe?, Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Chicago, Illinois, April1996. This article updates Lowenstein's earlier article on bribery law, Political
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784 (1985). For a general review of bribery and campaign finance law, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election
Law: Cases and Materials (Carolina Academic Press, 1995).
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tion limits are only distantly related to the goal of stopping quid
pro quo vote-trading, and certainly would never meet the Court's
"narrowly tailored" test.3&
The truth is that the contribution limits the Court upheld in
Buckley were aimed at far more than quid pro quo corruption.
The Buckley Court recognized this when it concluded that "laws
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only
the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to
influence governmental action. "39 Instead the Court saw the
problem as one of "political debts," that officials are "influenced
to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of ...
infusions of money into their campaigns. "4o The problem recognized here is one of generalized financial influence on legislators,
not pure vote-trading.4t
Indeed, it is not clear why a quid pro quo is any more corrupting than a contribution which influences a public official
more indirectly.4z In bribery law it makes sense to require that
there be evidence that the official explicitly agreed to trade a
vote for a contribution. Otherwise, we will never know for sure
if she was influenced by the money; there will always be doubt
about whether the gift was taken innocently.43 But the object of
38. Indeed, Justice Thomas has recently made this argument. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 116 S. Ct. at 2328-29.
39. 424 U.S. at 27-28.
40. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. See
supra notes 25-27.
41. Of course the contribution limits are partly justified on the other ground given in
Buckley, the appearance of corruption. The Court has, however, not given much consideration to this second interest, perhaps because it seems so open-ended: just about everything that happens in Washington may appear corrupt to somebody. In practice the
Court has often invoked the "appearance of corruption" standard, but has not given it
any independent weight.
Dennis Thompson makes a strong argument in favor of the appearance standard.
Because "citizens cannot easily collect the evidence they need to judge the motives of
politicians in particular circumstances," representatives "must avoid acting under conditions that give rise to a reasonable belief of wrongdoing." Thompson says that when
representatives fail this standard "they do not merely appear to do wrong, they do
wrong." Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual To Institutional Corruption 125-26 (The Brookings Institution, 1995).
42. Thompson makes this point as well: "There is ... no good reason to believe that
connections that are proximate and explicit are any more corrupt than connections that
are indirect and implicit." Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 112 (cited in note 41).
43. Even in bribery law it is not absolutely clear that a public official must agree to a
quid pro quo to be convicted. In McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257,271-74 (1991),
the Supreme Court reversed a bribery conviction because the jury had been instructed
that no quid pro quo was necessary to make a campaign contribution illegal. The Court
concluded that to allow a conviction without evidence of an explicit trade would cast a
shadow over everyday politics and make all legislators vulnerable to prosecution. Id. A
later decision, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), has thrown some confusion on
this holding, however. Some courts have interpreted bribery Jaws as prohibiting gifts that
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bribery laws is not the deal itself; the deal is just evidence that
influence has taken place. The reason we make bribery illegal is
that we don't want officials to be affected by monetary considerations, not that we have a particular animus against deal-making.
Even in bribery, then, the problem is not quid pro quo corruption, but the corruptive influence of money. Campaign finance
laws can address this problem by creating a contribution system
that limits the influence of money. Thus it makes no sense to say
that the contribution limits are aimed only at quid pro quo
corruption.
At times Court opinions seem to realize this. At other times
the Justices lapse back into quid pro quo language, perhaps because they realize the open-endedness of considering general financial influence a problem. If the ideal is a system in which
public officials are not influenced by campaign contributions,
how broadly should campaign finance laws be allowed to sweep?
One can imagine that, at the least, more extensive campaign regulation would be upheld under this standard.44 Nonetheless, the
Court in its more thoughtful moments has employed the monetary interest standard. When the prospect or the receipt of campaign money influences the behavior of public officials, they are
corrupted, whether or not a deal has been made. Although the
goal of stopping this kind of corruption must be weighed against
First Amendment interests, the Court has upheld contribution
limits on this basis.
III.

DOES MONEY CORRUPT?

I have argued that the Court is on firmest ground when it
adopts the "monetary influence" standard of corruption. But
what is it about monetary influence-or for that matter quid pro
do not involve explicit quid pro quos. In United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993),
a county executive in New York State was convicted under the federal Hobbs Act for
taking a $30,000 gift from a constituent. An appeals court concluded that the jury did not
need evidence of an explicit quid pro quo as long as it concluded that Coyne "accepted
the $30,000 knowing that it was payment related to his using his influence as County
Executive on (the constituent's) behalf as specific opportunities arose." ld. at 111. This
example involved a gift rather than a campaign contribution, and Lowenstein argues that
courts may correctly choose to invoke the more explicit quid pro quo standard in campaign finance cases. But in this, as in many other aspects of bribery statutes, the law is
unclear. Lowenstein concludes that the lack of clarity and stability in bribery law reflects
confusion over what exactly should be considered corrupt-the same problem the
Supreme Court has had in the campaign finance cases. See Lowenstein, When Is a Campaign Contribution a Bribe? (cited in note 37).
44. For instance, the Court might, if it more straightforwardly embraced the "monetary influence" conception of corruption, uphold a law regulating independent expenditures in candidate elections.
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quo trading-that is so corrupting? On what basis can we say
that public officials who are influenced by contributions are corrupt?4s Because the Court does not develop its own account of
what makes an action corrupt, we must go beyond the campaign
finance cases to answer these questions.
Daniel Lowenstein argues that the "payment of money to
bias the judgment or sway the loyalty of persons holding positions of public trust is a practice whose condemnation is deeply
rooted in our most ancient heritage."46 Lowenstein believes that
there is a strong cultural norm in our society that public officials
not be influenced by money, in the form of either gifts or campaign contributions. As evidence, Lowenstein cites both the
45. A related question is whether campaign contributions actually do influence representatives. The short answer, drawn from a growing body of evidence, is that contributions do influence representatives, but less than many suppose. Political scientists have
produced a wealth of studies on this question but are only beginning to answer it. Most of
the studies have attempted to measure the influence of PAC contributions on votes on the
floor. While the results are mixed, most of the studies find only small effects. Contributions seem to go to representatives already inclined-by ideology or constituency-to
support the contributor. But floor voting is only the tip of the iceberg of legislative
activity.
There is little investigation of how contributions influence behavior in committee.
where most legislating (and deliberating) gets done. though one study found significant
effects on legislators' level of activity on behalf of contributors. See Richard L. Hall and
Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 797 (1990). Similarly there is a paucity of
research on how contributions influence representatives' willingness to meet with constituents or intervene for them in administrative disputes (like the Keating affair). On the
access issue, see Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. of
Politics 1052 (1986}. On floor voting, see Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36
Public Choice 301 (1981); Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit- Tobit Model, 64 Rev. of Economics and Statistics 7783 (1982); Garey Durden and Jonathan Silberman, Determining Legislative Preferences on
the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. of Pol. Economy 317 (1976); Diana
Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-Cal/ Voting: Conditional Power in Allan J. Cigler and
Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics (Congressional Q., 2d ed. 1986); John P.
Frendreis and Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate
Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 Soc. Sci. Q. 401 (1986); Janet M. Grenzke, PACs and
the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex, 33 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 1 (1989);
James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, Congressmen, Constituents and Contributors: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Jean
Reith Schroedel, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Outcomes 39 Western Pol. Q.
371 (1986); W.P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and
Dairy Price Supports, 35 Western Pol. Q. 478 (1982); Allen Wilhite and John Theilmann,
Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach, 53
Public Choice 267 (1987); John R. Wright, PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 400 (1985); John R. Wright, Contributions,
Lobbying and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 417 (1990).
46. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is
Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 301, 302 (1989).
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writings of various scholars on the subject, and the law of bribery, which in many jurisdictions makes quid pro quo campaign
contributions illegal.47 Thus Lowenstein appeals to the public
opinion and legal norms approaches in defining financial influence as corruption. As noted earlier, these are problematic appeals. Lowenstein has no polling data to show that the vast
majority of Americans agree with his norm, but even if he did we
might still contend that Americans are simply misguided in
believing that financial influence is corrupting. Martin Shapiro
argues that Lowenstein, by operating as a "cultural anthropologist," might be able to discover a societal norm, but that such
a norm cannot be the basis of constitutional law: "There is a cultural norm of racism in our society. Does the existence of such a
norm give constitutional legitimacy to racist statutes?"4B Shapiro
maintains that Lowenstein cannot define what is corrupt merely
by reference to social norms or legal principles. Even the fact
that bribery statutes often cover campaign contributions traded
for political favors is not determinative. Only a theoretical argument can answer the question. Everything else is questionbegging.49
Thus any serious thinking about corruption must move us
back to first principles, to fundamental beliefs about government.
The debate over the place of corruption in campaign finance ultimately turns on the theoretical foundations of representative
democracy.
In several recent articles Dennis Thompson has grounded
his approach to legislative ethics in a theory of representation
which stresses deliberation. The debate between Thompson and
Bruce Cain, another expert on campaign finance, illustrates the
deep roots of the controversy over corruption.
Representation and Deliberation

Thompson advances a seemingly simple notion: In a functioning democracy, representatives must deliberate about the
public good. Private interests have a legitimate place in a democracy as long as they subject themselves to "the rigors of the democratic process." To get their way, private interests must
convincingly articulate public purposes.so
47. See generally id.
48. Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18
Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 387 (1989).
49. Id. at 387-94.
50. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 28 (cited in note 41). The only alternative is
logrolling, but recent research suggests that logrolling is both more difficult and more rare
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Private interests which attempt to bypass this deliberative
process are "agents of corruption."sl They tempt representatives
to ignore public purposes and to pay attention to influences "that
are clearly irrelevant to any process of deliberation."s2
What influences are clearly irrelevant? Thompson gives as
his primary example personal gain. Personal gain tends to take
time and attention away from what should be the job of the legislator and can overwhelm the "unsteady inclination to pursue the
public good."s3 Thus bribes, for example, corrupt the deliberative process.
Campaign contributions, Thompson says, are different from
bribes because they are a necessary part of the political process.
Moreover, Thompson says we should admire those who, within
limits, pursue political gain, including campaign contributions.s4
But campaign contributions corrupt deliberative democracy
when they influence representatives to change their stands or to
refocus their energies.ss Thus Thompson accepts what I have
called the "monetary influence" standard of corruption. For him,
campaign contributions that seek to influence elections are vital
to the democratic process, but those that seek to influence the
representatives' decisions corrupt the process. Thompson shows
how a deliberative theory of representation leads to a "monetary
influence" standard of corruption.
In a recent article, however, Bruce Cain rejects both deliberative theory and the monetary interest standard. Cain argues
that deliberative theory is "excessively restrictive and very naive," and that it is out of step with the philosophical foundations
of American government.s6 Further, Cain suggests that Thompthan is commonly supposed. See Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (U. of Michigan Press, 1991). Of 29 case studies of legislation considered in Congress
between 1945 and 1970, Joseph Bessette found only four examples of logrolling. And
even in those cases logrolling turned out to be only a small part of the story, with deliberation on the merits also playing an important role. Bessette even argues that the case
often held up as the paradigmatic instance of logrolling, the creation of the food stamp
program, was more a matter of deliberation. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government 67-99 (U. of Chicago
Press, 1994).
51. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 28 (cited in note 41).
52. Id. at 20. Thompson calls this the independence principle. In his earlier writings
Thompson calls it the principle of autonomy; see Political Ethics and Public Office 111-16
(Harvard U. Press, 1987). The argument is also outlined in Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369 (1993).
53. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 21 (cited in note 41).
54. ld. at 66.
55. Id. at 117.
56. Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. of
Chi. Legal F. 111, 120.
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son's approach relies on Edmund Burke's trustee notion of representation, which, Cain claims, is not widely accepted.
Instead Cain offers his own "procedural fairness" vision of
democracy, drawn from the pluralist tradition in political science.
He groups under this label theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter,
Anthony Downs, Robert Dahl, and James Madison (or at least,
Dahl's rendition of Madison). What these otherwise disparate
theorists share, according to Cain, is an approach to politics that
is nondeliberative. Each treats democracy as a matter of preference aggregation, and each expects representatives to act as delegates in order to be elected.s7 For proceduralists, Cain seems to
conclude, the notion of corruption in campaign finance is simply
meaningless. If, after all, politics is simply a matter of counting
preferences, campaign contributions can be seen as a kind of
vote, a way to signal the direction (and intensity) of one's desires.
Money is then just another currency in the counting process, one
which advantages some groups and disadvantages others. The
only real issue in campaign finance, according to Cain, is how to
Cain also claims that the deliberative theory "rests on the rationalist's faith that right
reasons can be found for actions, and that political discourse will lead to the discovery of
commonly acknowledged truth." ld. at 120. The first charge is true only in the modest
sense that deliberative theory demands that representatives give reasons for their actions
and that debate focus on the adequacy of those reasons (see the discussion of Cass Sunstein's "republic of reasons," supra note 56). As to the second charge, that deliberative
theorists naively believe that debate will lead to consensus, nothing in deliberative theory
necessitates this belief. If people are completely immune to persuasion, then of course
deliberation is futile. But as long as debate is capable of moving people, then the fact of
pluralism is quite compatible with deliberative theory. Hanna Pitkin eloquently expresses
the deliberative view of democracy:
Political life is not merely the making of arbitrary choices, nor merely the resultant of bargaining between separate, private wants. It is always a combination of
bargaining and compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting commitments, and common deliberation about public policy, to which facts and rational
arguments are relevant.
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 212 (U. California Press,
1967).
Some versions of republican theory do seem incompatible with pluralism. But as
Frank Michelman has argued, republican theory at its best depends on the diversity of
views "that citizens bring to the debate of the commonwealth." Michelman seeks to resolve the tension between republicanism and pluralism in his article Law's Republic, 97
Yale L.J. 1493, 1504 (1988).
57. Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 122 (cited in note 56). Strictly speaking, the
proceduralist representative is not really a delegate but a "rational actor." She is not
committed to the norm of following the views of her constituency but simply to saving her
own skin-or, as the economists like to say, maximizing her utility-whatever that involves. Normally one of the best ways to get reelected is to follow the opinion ?f m~e's
constituency, so there is often a happy marriage between the delegate ro_le and ra~10n~ltty,
but a divorce is always possible. In a system with uncontrolled camprugn contnbuttons,
for example, it may be rational for a representative to dismiss the views of a majority of
her district when they conflict with the desires of a generous contributor.
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count fairly, and opinions about this will naturally differ depending on which groups one favors.ss
The conflict between Thompson and Cain is so fundamental
that it is difficult to arbitrate. Perhaps the best place to start is
with Cain's contention that deliberative theory is a "nontraditional conception of American democracy."s9 This is a surprising
claim, for as Thompson argues, deliberation was at the center of
the Framers' conception of representative government.6o The
Federalist Papers, for example, justify many aspects of the Constitution-separation of powers, bicameralism, methods of election,
size of legislative bodies-in terms of their effect on the deliberative process. The aim was to replace the excess of passion and
"local spirit" that had overtaken state legislators with a concern
for "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community,"
or as the Federalist Papers variously puts it, "the good of the
whole," "the public weal," "great and national objects," "the
great and aggregate interests," the "common interest," the "common good of the society," and the "comprehensive interests of
[the] country."61 Indeed, Madison's famous defense of an extended republic in Federalist 10 was built on deliberative theory.
He argued that such a republic was more likely than other systems of government
to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations.62

Madison was, of course, a subtle thinker who understood the
complex interplay of interests and deliberation, so one is likely to
oversimplify his views by selective quotation. Yet the delibera58. Cain argues that "By littering the intellectual landscape with irrelevant issues,
moralist/idealists obstruct the path to a full, open discussion of the public's views about
the proper distribution of power and influence." Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 112
(cited in note 56).
59. Id. at 120.
60. Thompson, Ethics in Congress at 19 (cited in note 41).
61. This point is made by Joseph Bessette in Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason at 27
(cited in note 50) (quoting the Federalist Papers).
62. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, eds., The
Federalist Papers, 77, 82 (Arlington House, 1966). Of course Madison was not so naive as
to believe that representatives would always deliberate in the public interest, but he
thought this ideal would be more closely approached in an extended republic, where factions would have a difficult time gaining control over the government. Daniel Lowenstein, in a review of Cain's paper, also makes the point that Madison was no
"proceduralist." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption:
Comments on Strauss and Cain. 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 163, 177.

144

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:127

tive aspects of his thought cannot be denied. Over the past three
decades, scholars in law, history and political science have
demonstrated the profound influence of republican theory, with
its emphasis on deliberation about the public good, on the
thought of the Framers, particularly Madison. The historian
Gordon Wood concludes that Madison and the Federalists were
far from "modern-day pluralists":
They still clung to the republican ideal of an autonomous public authority that was different from the many private interests
of the society.... Nor did they see public policy or the common interest of the national government emerging naturally
from the give-and-take of these clashing private interests ....
Far, then, from the new national government being a mere integrator and harmonizer of the different special interests in
the society, it would become a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions and interest
in the State."63

The Framers, in sum, embraced deliberative theory.
The elitism of the Framers, who envisioned rule by a virtuous gentry, soon fell out of favor.64 But their concern for deliberation has lived on. A long list of studies highlights the continuing
importance of deliberation in American democratic theory and
practice. As Philip Selznick writes in a recent review, "Deliberative democracy is moving to the forefront of political theory."6s
63. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 253 (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992) (quoting from a Jetter by Madison to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, in
the Papers of Madison, IX, 370, 384).
Other historians who trace the influence of republicanism on the Framers include
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition 506-52 (Princeton U. Press, 1975): Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution 22-54 (Belknap Press, 1967).
Foremost among legal scholars who have embraced republicanism are Cass Sunstein
and Frank Michelman. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press.
1993); and Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
For a particularly forceful analysis of Madison's thinking by a political scientist, see
James Q. Wilson, Interests and Deliberation in the American Republic, or, Why James
Madison Would Never Have Received the James Madison Award, 23 Pol. Sci. and Politics
4, 561 (1990}.
64. Wood documents this process in The Radicalism of the American Revolution at
255-305 (cited in note 63).
65. Philip Selmick, Defining Democracy Up, 119 The Public Interest 106 (1995).
There is much literature on deliberative democracy in political theory. For some examples see James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic
Reform (Yale U. Press, 1991}; Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in
Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17
(Basil Blackwell, 1989); John W. Kingdon, Politicians, Self-Interest, and Ideas in George
E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, eds., Reconsidering the Democratic Public 73 (Penn-
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But attention to deliberation is hardly limited to theorists. Political scientists have confirmed the central role of deliberation in
American government in their study of legislatures, courts, bureaucracies and the presidency. In his recent book on deliberative theory and practice Joseph Bessette cites thirty-three such
studies.66
A few examples should suffice. Cass Sunstein argues, based
on a review of the fundamentals of constitutional jurisprudence,
that we live in a "republic of reasons." Courts, he says, will strike
down laws based only on "naked preferences," the mere assertion of private power. To act constitutionally, legislators must
provide a public-regarding rationale for their policies. It is
through the process of deliberation that these rationales are articulated and judged.67 Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk trace
the influence of ideas and deliberation on regulatory reform of
the telecommunications, trucking and airline industries in The
Politics of Deregulation.68 Richard F. Fenno finds that making
"good public policy" through a careful study of issues is the dominant goal of representatives who seek a position on the Education and Labor and Foreign Affairs committees.69 As Joseph
Bessette has suggested, when political scientists actually examine
the process of policymaking they find plenty of deliberation going on.1o
Deliberative theory is untraditional only among some pluralist political scientists, who, beginning with Robert Dahl, have
downplayed the republican and deliberative aspects of American
government. The tradition from which Cain works starts not
with Jefferson, Hamilton, or Madison, but rather with Arthur
Bentley, David Truman, and Dahl.71 The vision of American desylvania State U. Press, 1993); Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy in John W.
Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds., Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV, 126-60 (New
York U. Press, 1993); David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, 60 Pol.
Stud. 54-67 (1992).
66. Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason notes at 251-52 (cited in note 50).
67. See Sunstein, Partial Constitution at 17-39 (cited in note 63).
68. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 147-206 (The
Brookings Institution, 1985).
69. Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Little, Brown and Co., 1973).
Fenno's classic work on representation in practice is Home Style: House Members in Their
Districts (HarperCollins, 1978). For an updating of this book see Jonathan Bernstein,
Adrienne Bird Jamieson and Christine Trost, eds., Campaigning for Congress: Politicians
at Home and in Washington (Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1995).
70. See Bessette, Mild Voice of Reason at 67-99 (cited in note 50).
71. The most influential books in this tradition are Robert A. Dahl, A Preface To
Democratic Theory (U. of Chicago Press, 1956); David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2d ed. 1971); Arthur F.
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mocracy as preference aggregationn is widespread among political scientists and public choice theorists, but outside of these
narrow realms it is hard to say how well it resonates. Whatever
popular opinion would hold, though, Cain clearly underestimates
the centrality of deliberative theory in American political
thought and practice.
Cain's argument that Thompson relies on a trustee theory of
representation, however, points to a more troubling issue.73 In
Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (U. of Chicago Press,
1908).
72. Cass Sunstein claims that what unifies pluralists is the notion that "laws should
be understood not as a product of deliberation, but on the contrary as a kind of commodity, subject to the usual forces of supply and demand." Sunstein, Partial Constitution at 2425 (cited in note 63). Similarly, Frank Michelman defines pluralism as "the deep mistrust
of people's capacities to communicate persuasively to one another their diverse normative
experiences . . . . Pluralism, that is, doubts or denies our ability to communicate such
material in ways that move each other's views on disputed normative issues towards felt
(not merely strategic) agreement without deception, coercion, or other manipulation."
Michelman, 97 Yale L.J. at 1493, 1507 (cited in note 63).
Whether this is characteristic of all pluralist thought is questionable. Nelson Polsby,
who has done much to popularize the term "pluralism," maintains that pluralism is often
caricatured by critics who argue against its most extravagant formulations. See Nelson W.
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory: A Funher Look at Problems of Evidence
and Inference (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1980). Polsby contends that on the issue of deliberation, pluralism is silent. (Polsby himself values deliberation, as is seen in his Consequences of Party Reform (Oxford U. Press, 1983)).
On this point, as on several others, there appears to be a plurality of pluralisms.
Sunstein and Michelman seem to be particularly concerned with public choice approaches
to politics, which can be seen as an outgrowth of pluralism but hardly encompass the sum
of pluralist thought. In any case, Cain's approach-and the approach of the theorists he
relies on, including Dahl-is to see politics as exclusively a matter of preference
aggregation.
73. Cain offers no evidence for his contention that the delegate model of representation is more widely accepted than the trustee model. I could locate only a few instances
of polling on this question. In 1938, when respondents were asked, "Do you believe that
a Congressman should ... vote on any question as the majority of his constituents desire,
or vote according to his own judgment?" Thirty-seven percent chose the delegate side,
54% the trustee side. (Roper Center Archives, accession number 0175920, survey sponsored by Fortune, August 1938.) A more recent survey asked: "When your Representative in Congress votes on an issue, which should be more important-the way voters in
your district feel about that issue, or the Representative's own principles and judgment
about what is best for the country?" Sixty-eight percent chose the delegate side, 24% the
trustee side. (Roper Center Archives, accession number 0192631, survey sponsored by
Time!CNN, February 10, 1993.) It is unclear whether this represents a time trend or a
difference in question wording.
The vast majority of Americans probably haven't devoted much time to thinking
about the delegate/trustee issue. Those who have often reject the formulation of a strict
dichotomy between the two modes. When members of Congress were asked a delegate/
trustee question, some rejected it as simplistic. "Who dreamed up these stupid questions?" asked one respondent. Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office at 99 (cited
in note 52). Moreover, John Kingdon finds that the delegate/trustee dichotomy fails to
capture the complex ways in which members of Congress think about and perform their
jobs. John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (U. Michigan Press, 3d ed.
1989).
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fact Thompson attempts to distinguish his approach from the
trustee notion. He points out that the views of the constituency
and the views of the representative about what is in the public
interest are likely on many issues to coincide. Where they do
conflict, however, Thompson says that representatives may voice
their constituents' views in order to give them a hearing in the
deliberative process. As long as the process itself is deliberative,
as long as it focuses on the merits of the issue, it does not matter
whether the individual representative is delegate or trustee.7 4
And this suggests an important difference between trustee/delegate theories of representation and deliberative theory: Where
the trustee/delegate dichotomy focuses on the level of the individual representative, the deliberative theory leads us to look at
what is happening to the institution as a whole.
Yet this refinement creates another difficulty, one that
Thompson does not address. If in a deliberative democracy representatives can in some circumstances act as delegates for their
constituents, why can they not also act as delegates for their contributors?7s I think the answer is that Thompson allows for only
Hanna Pitkin concludes that the dichotomy, which she prefers to call the "mandateindependence controversy," "poses a logically insoluble puzzle, asking us to choose between two elements that are both involved in the concept of representation." Pitkin,
Concept of Representation at 165 (cited in note 56). As Pitkin, Thompson and others have
suggested, we might be better off in discussions of representation if we dropped the notion of a dichotomy between trustees and delegates entirely.
74. Thompson is somewhat elusive on this point:
[T]he ideal legislator in a representative system does not pursue the public interest exclusively (whatever it may be). Such a legislator also has an ethical obligation to constituents that must be weighed against the obligation to a broader
public. To find the balance between these obligations, even to decide whether
they conflict, the legislator must consider the particular political circumstances
at the time . . . . Ethical obligations of these kinds are contingent on what is
going on in the legislative process as a whole and may differ for different members and vary over time for all members.
Ethics in Congress at 70-71 (cited in note 41). Elsewhere Thompson says that the
deliberative principle "is consistent with conceptions of representation ranging from delegate to trustee." The principle requires only that representatives defend their views on
public policy "in a public forum-and at the risk of political defeat." I d. at 114. Similarly:
[R]eelection or party loyalty could also count as principled reasons, when they
are consistent with ... legislative deliberation.
Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office at 113-14. Thompson does not specify
how far this goes. At some point, presumably, the forces of constituency pressure, reelection anxiety, or party loyalty overwhelm the process of deliberation.
As these passages indicate, Thompson, like many other political theorists, is quite
critical of the delegate/trustee dichotomy. See for example Thompson, Representatives in
the Welfare State in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State 131, 132-36
(Princeton U. Press, 1988).
75. This is the crux of David Strauss's argument against the deliberative approach to
the concept of corruption. See David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance
Reform? 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. 141.
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a narrow exception to the basic rule that representatives must
deliberate. In giving voice to the views of their constituents, representatives can on some occasions move deliberation forward.
But if a significant number of representatives are acting solely as
delegates, ignoring not only the arguments of others but even
their own views, deliberative democracy is imperiled.76 This corruption of the deliberative process is much more likely when representatives fall under the sway of their contributors.
Contributor-influenced representatives are unlikely to be candid
about the motivation for their actions; the last thing they want is
an open examination of the quality of their reasons and their
process of deliberation. Thus where contributor-influenced representatives predominate, legislative deliberation becomes a
sham. By contrast, constituent-influenced legislators can acknowledge the pressures on them and, where their own views
conflict with those of the constituents, can even deliberate publicly about how the two can be reconciled.?? Constituent influence can itself become a matter for deliberation in a way that
contributor influence never can. Hence contributor influence is
much more likely than constituent influence to have a pernicious
effect on deliberative democracy.
Deliberative theory, then, provides a grounding for the monetary influence standard of corruption. If politics is nothing
more than a market, and politicians nothing more than retailers,
than there is no need for deliberation, and no necessary problem
with "bribery" through the campaign finance process. That is the
vision behind Cain's procedural theory. But if representation involves deliberation about the public good, then contributions
that influence representatives are a corruption of the democratic
process.
Deliberative theory is well-grounded in American political
philosophy and practice. It is an attractive, approachable ideal.
Its appeal explains why, despite criticisms like those voiced by
Cain, academic, legal and popular debate about campaign finance continues to revolve around notions of corruption.

76. Hanna Pitkin goes so far as to say that when representatives act as pure delegates they are no longer doing something that can be called representation. See Pitkin,
Concept of Representation at 210-211 (cited in note 56).
77. This is a point that Lowenstein makes; see Lowenstein, 1995 U. Chi. Legal F. at
191 (cited in note 62).
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IV. THE UTILITY OF "CORRUPTION"
I have argued that the concept of corruption can be applied
to one of the major problems in campaign finance, the influence
that contributors have on the actions of representatives. The
monetary influence standard of corruption has been invoked in
several Supreme Court cases, but the Court has drifted in its
treatment of corruption. At some points the Court characterizes
the issue as a matter of vote trading, of quid pro quos. At other
times, the Court has portrayed the problem as one of "distortion" of public opinion. Nonetheless, I believe the Court has
been on firmest ground when it has recognized the issue as one
of contributor influence.
Of course this recognition would not by itself determine the
constitutionality of any particular regulatory scheme. Indeed it is
just one of the factors involved. People may balance the goal of
preventing corruption and the First Amendment interests at
stake differently even though they recognize the legitimacy of
both claims. Still, by focusing on the meaning of corruption I
hope I have given some sense of its place in this mix.
Clearly corruption is a limited concept. It cannot encompass
all the concerns we have about the campaign finance system. 78
Because so much stress has been put on corruption in campaign
finance law, there will always be a temptation to use it more
broadly to cover goals that are only partly related-to stretch its
meaning, as I believe the Court has done in Austin. Austin's
proclamation that the political system is corrupted when campaign contributions don't mirror public opinion cannot be maintained. "Corruption" will be drained of meaning if it becomes a
mere synonym for "inequality." The concept of corruption has a
worthy place in campaign finance law, and if the Court chooses
to recognize other interests in campaign regulation it should not
tarnish this one.

78. Cain complains that Thompson's approach to corruption fails to address many of
the key issues in campaign finance, particularly the inequalities created in the election
system by disparities in campaign contributions. Cain, 1995 U. of Chi. Legal F. at 122
(cited in note 56). But those who embrace corruption as an important concept in campaign finance law need not limit themselves to this one principle. The American campaign finance system is flawed in many respects, and no one principle can capture all of
them.
Indeed if Cain had merely argued that too much attention is given to issues of corruption in the popular debate over campaign finance and not enough to other concerns I
would be in full agreement.

